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| "Giri" - Duty, Obligation (Japanese Kanji) |
Michael P. Atkinson 1, Alexander Gutfraind 2, Moshe Kress 1
Abstract
Major revolts have recently erupted in parts of the Middle East with substantial international repercussions. Predicting, coping with and winning those revolts have become a grave problem for many regimes and for world powers. We propose a new model of such revolts that describes their evolution by building on the classic Lanchester theory of combat. The model accounts for the split in the population between those loyal to the regime and those favoring the rebels. We show that, contrary to classical Lanchesterian insights regarding traditional force-on-force engagements, the outcome of a revolt is independent of the initial force sizes; it only depends on the fraction of the population supporting each side and their combat effectiveness. We also consider the effects of foreign intervention and of shifting loyalties of the two populations during the conflict. The model’s predictions are consistent with the situations currently observed in Afghanistan, Libya and Syria (Spring 2011) and it offers tentative guidance on policy.
When I read this: it gives pause that we assume this information is at the disposal, read and considered, of decision makers of either political party, that the investment of time and treasure (i.e. lives), is not a political calculation for either party’s benefit. No one wants to be the “one” or “the party” that ends a conflict on their watch, and it goes horribly wrong. Not that the three conflicts draining our resources – other than OBL – has gone brilliantly RIGHT most of our involvement in the Near East.
I have a personal interest in that my oldest son is going in the service: as a Combat Medic.
My plan is for him and his younger brother to eventually bury me!
Physics arXiv: Lanchester Theory and the Fate of Armed Revolts
Wolfram: Ordinary Differential Equations
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